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I evaluate the welfare effects of exogenous changes in immigration policy by 
constructing a heterogeneous agent overlapping generations model with agents differing 
in age, origin, and skills. Calibrating the model to Germany, I match the main features of 
the social security and tax systems, and account for differences in inter-generational 
transmission of skills and fertility between immigrants and natives. I find that a 
prohibition on immigration reduces welfare for the natives, whereas a policy that allows 
an annual inflow equal to 0.4 percent of the population increases welfare for all agents on 
the new balanced growth path (by 0.1 to 2.8 percent depending on the type of the agent). 
Interactions between the social security system, taxes, and equilibrium prices are crucial: 
immigration reduces wages, but raises the rental rate of capital and the number of 
workers per retiree, allowing for higher pension benefits and a lower consumption tax 
rate. 
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1 Introduction 
Does immigration reduce or increase the welfare of current and future generations when 
an economy experiences rapid aging of its population? Many studies in the literature 
provide mixed evidence by focusing on individual aspects of the problem, such as fiscal 
sustainability through immigration or the labor market effects of immigrants.  
This paper quantifies the effects of changes in immigration policy on individual 
welfare by constructing a five-period life-cycle general equilibrium model. It contributes 
to the literature by explicitly accounting for the interactions between the labor market and 
the three pillars of fiscal policy: the tax system, the social security system, and the 
immigration policy. The model is calibrated to the German economy, which provides a 
natural experiment. Germany has historically been the major destination for immigrants 
in Europe and it provides rich micro-data on immigrants and natives that is necessary to 
identify main characteristics of the two groups, such as differences in skills and fertility. 
Moreover, Germany is one of the most prominent cases of aging: the ratio of the 
population aged 65 and older to those aged 15 to 65 (the dependency ratio) is estimated to 
increase from 28 percent to 50 percent in the next 45 years.
1  
Perhaps Germany is the most interesting economy to study due to recent changes 
in tax and social security policies in response to aging. First, marginal tax rates on labor 
income were reduced dramatically to increase the supply of labor (the top and bottom 
rates fell by 11 percent). Contemporaneously, immigration policy was reformed to favor 
inflow of high-skilled workers. Finally, the pension benefit formula was modified to 
include a “sustainability factor,” which reduces payments to retirees when the 
dependency ratio increases. The model presented here incorporates these elements. 
  We take each model period to be 20 years. Agents differ in origin (immigrant or 
native), age, and skill level (low or high). Life span is uncertain. The model replicates 
key features of tax and pension systems. In particular, there are marginal labor income 
                                                 
1 Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2003) report that before the pension system was reformed in 2001 and 2005, 
projections indicated that the payroll tax rate needed to finance German pensions would increase from 
today's 19.5 percent to more than 28 percent in 2040, if the benefit levels and labor force participation rates 
were maintained.    3
and payroll taxes, and pensions are indexed to lifetime earnings via a benefit calculation 
formula. A key element of the model is the number of people of each type in each period. 
To make the evolution of the distribution of population precise, I calculate skill- and 
origin-specific fertility from the data as well as a Markov skill transition matrix, which 
shows the probability that a child of a particular type of parent will have high or low skill. 
The model is calibrated by using individual level micro-data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel. 
In the baseline, I assume that the economy is on the balanced growth path with 
annual inflow of low- and high-skilled immigrants equal to 0.1 and 0.01 percent of the 
population, respectively. Combined, this corresponds to an initial annual net inflow of 
83,000 people, which is in line with the data in 2005 provided by the German Statistical 
Institute.
2 I solve for the equilibrium transition path of the economy and report results 
from six different experiments in which either the skill composition or the total inflow of 
the immigrants change.  
There are three important conclusions. First, higher immigrant inflows increase 
welfare by causing a decline in the dependency ratio, which allows the government to 
balance its budget with a lower consumption tax rate. For example, when annual inflows 
of young working-age immigrants of each skill level are 0.2 percent of the population, 
welfare of initial young natives is 2.8 percent higher compared to welfare under the 
baseline economy. The increase is around 2.0 percent for 40-59 year old natives, 0.9 
percent for 60-79 year old natives, and 0.1 percent for the initial old generation. Second, 
increases in life-expectancy make the returns from immigration higher: under the same 
immigrant inflow, when the survival probability to age 80+ is doubled, welfare increases 
by a bigger factor (3.1 percent for the initial young). Third, keeping the total inflow 
constant, reversing the skill composition of immigrants improves welfare by the same 
order of magnitude.  
In this paper, increased immigration not only raises the size of the labor force, but 
also lowers real wages. This negatively affects pension benefits, as benefits are strongly 
linked to past wages. However, there are two other impacts of immigration. The first is 
the rise in return to capital, which raises the return on savings. The second effect comes 
                                                 
2 Genesis (The Federal Statistical Office of Germany database system).   4
through “the sustainability factor” in the pension benefit calculation formula. 
Specifically, when aging leads to an increase in the retiree-contributor ratio, the 
sustainability factor reduces the value of each pension point earned, which in turn reduces 
the pension benefit. Hence, when the economy experiences a higher immigrant inflow, 
pension benefits rise, as the number of pensioners per worker declines. In equilibrium, 
these two positive effects dominate the negative effect of declining wages, and therefore 
the consumption of a retiree increases. 
  This study contributes to a large literature in public finance that focuses on the 
relationship between demographic transition, fiscal sustainability, and immigration. 
Storesletten (2000) and Bonin, Raffelhueschen, and Walliser (2000) ask whether 
immigrants can help sustain fiscal policy, without a specific emphasis on individual 
welfare. The former uses a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium model and concludes 
that a policy that admits 1.6 million 40-44-year-old high-skilled immigrants annually 
could resolve the fiscal problems associated with the aging of the baby boom generation 
in the U.S. The latter uses the generational accounting framework (Auerbach, Gokhale, 
and Kotlikoff, 1994) and finds that immigration can only partially decrease the fiscal 
burden of future generations induced by aging in Germany. Others study labor-market 
effects of immigrants with an emphasis on wages. Pischke and Velling (1997) finds no 
evidence of detrimental effects on native wages by using data on Germany, while Borjas 
(2003) concludes that a 10 percent increase in supply reduces wages by 3 to 4 percent in 
the U.S.  
Krueger (1999), Fehr (2000), Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, and Joines (1995), 
Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, and Fuster (2003) focus on quantifying welfare effects of 
social security without explicitly modeling immigration policy. A three-region world 
economy (U.S., Japan, and the Euro-region) model with labor immobility appears in 
Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoff (2005), which concludes that, independent of the skill level, 
an expansion of immigration will not alter the capital shortage, tax hikes, and the 
reduction in real wages expected along the demographic transition. My approach in this 
paper is unique, as the impact of immigration on welfare is studied by incorporating the 
details of the social security system and the tax policy in the model, which are necessary 
to identify the interaction among different components of fiscal policy.   5
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2 The Model 
The economy consists of three sectors: heterogeneous individuals with elastic labor 
supply, a perfectly competitive representative firm with constant returns to scale 
production technology, and a government that balances its budget. 
 
2.1 Individuals 
Individuals live for a maximum of five periods and differ with respect to age, origin, and 
working ability. A model period is 20 years. In period one (youth), individuals do not 
work or save. They derive consumption from the transfer income paid by the 
government. In periods two and three (adulthood), individuals choose optimal 
consumption c, working hours n, and end-of-period wealth holding a, taking the taxes, 
factor prices, and the immigration policy as given. They pay payroll and labor income 
taxes with marginal rates  p τ  and τ , respectively. Consumption and capital income are 
taxed at flat rates  c τ  and  k τ . Individuals can have children only in the second period, 
between the ages of 20 and 39. The fertility rate is exogenous. In periods four and five 
(retirement), individuals do not work. Hence, consumption is derived from government 
transfers  χ and proceeds from assets. There is longevity uncertainty. The conditional 
probability of surviving from age i to i+1 is  i λ . In case of accidental death, individual 
wealth becomes a part of the government's revenue. 
The type of an agent alive in t is denoted by  ) , , ( s o i , where  { } 1,2,3,4,5 i∈  is 
age;  { } , om n ∈  is origin,  n o =  for natives and  m o =  for immigrants; and { } , sl h ∈ is 
working ability (or productivity), sl =  for low-ability, sh =  for high-ability.  
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An agent's efficiency units,  ,, ios e , is exogenously given. Wage per efficiency unit 
is w. Therefore,  ,, ,,, ti o si o s t we n  is the total labor income of an agent who supplies n units of 
labor at t. A tax function T computes total taxes paid on labor income (the sum of payroll 
and income taxes). A pension function P computes the benefit for an individual as a 
function of his labor earnings and average earnings  y  in the economy during adulthood. 
Tables 1 and 2 show the main variables and functions used in the model. 
 
2.1.1 The Individual’s Problem 
An individual born at t chooses { } ,,, ,,, 1 ,,, ,,, ,, iost iost i ost iost nca +  to maximize expected utility  
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2.1.2 Skill Transmission and the Measure of Newborns 
I assume that children of immigrants are natives and that individuals can have children 
only in the second period of their lives. Transmission of skills from parents to children 
follows a Markov process. Let  , os ϕ  denote the number of children per person of origin-o 
and skill-s. Let  2, , , ost μ  denote the number of child-bearing individuals at time t. Let  , os π  8
be the probability that a parent of origin-o and skill-s will have a high-skilled child. Then, 
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Skills are assumed to be exogenous and fixed during an agent’s lifetime.  
 
2.2 The Firm’s Problem 
The representative firm hires labor ( t N ) and capital ( t K ) to produce output. The 
production function is Cobb-Douglas: 
  ()
θ θ − =
1
t t t t N z K Y ,          ( 1 )  
where  zt is an exogenous labor augmenting productivity process with deterministic 
growth rate Γ. The aggregate labor input  t N  is the sum of efficiency units supplied by 
each agent in the economy: 
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The aggregate capital input  t K  is the sum of total private wealth: 
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Let δ be the depreciation rate of the capital stock. Given the rental rate of capital  t r  and 
the wage rate t w , the firm maximizes profits: 
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2.3 The Government 
Fiscal policy consists of flat tax rate  k τ   on capital income and  c τ  on consumption; 
marginal labor income tax rate τ  and payroll tax rate  p τ ; per-capita age-specific public 
expenditures  i g ; per capita pension benefit P  that is conditional on a worker’s   9
productivity, and public transfers (excluding pensions) χ  that are age- and origin-
specific.
3 
Age-specific per-capita government expenditures grow at the growth rate of the 
per-capita Gross National Product, Γ.





ti i o s t
ios
Gg μ =+ Γ∑ .         ( 5 )  
 Let  ,, ,,, () ti o si o s t Tw e n  denote the total income and payroll taxes paid out of labor 
income by a type  ) , , ( s o i  individual. Denote the aggregate tax revenues of the 
government by Revt, aggregate non-pension related transfers by  t TR , and aggregate 
pension benefits as Pent. Then, 
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Government balances budget in each period. The consumption tax adjusts to 
maintain balance. Hence, 
tt t t GT RP e n R e v ++ = .         ( 9 )  
 
2.4 Immigration Policy 
Immigration policy  { } 2, 2, , lh ψ ψψ = determines the number of immigrants of age 20-39 
(model age 2) of each ability level (low and high) as a fixed fraction of the size of the 
population in the previous period. I do not consider an inflow of immigrants aged 40 to 
59. Akin (2006) shows that such a policy will not be welfare improving because those 
agents, on average, contribute for fewer years to the social security system compared to 
the longer years of retirement benefits they receive. Therefore, I analyze a class of 
immigration policies that allow the entry of younger workers. 
                                                 
3 The cost of bringing one more agent to the economy is  i g . This parameter depends only on the age of an 
agent. It is crucial to consider different costs of immigrants and natives on the government’s budget; 
however such disaggregated data on government expenditures is not available. 
4 See Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Hagemann, and Nicoletti (1989).   10
2.5 Law of Motion for Population 
Let  t μ denote the total population in the economy at time t. Given the immigration policy 
ψ , children per person { } {} , , os om n ϕ
∈ , skill transition probabilities { } {} { } , ,, , os om n sl h π
∈∈ , and 
survival probabilities { } {} 1,2,3,4 i i λ
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The skill transition probabilities are important in determining the number of agents who 
are high- or low-skilled at any time in the economy. Several studies in the literature 
established that many countries experience a low intergenerational mobility in schooling 
and income. For example, by using German micro-data, Dustmann (2005) reports that 
parental background is strongly related to the school choice and school achievement of 
the child. He also finds little convergence for individuals from different parental 
backgrounds. Acemoglu and Pischke (2001) find that a 10 percent increase in family 
income generates a 1.4 percent increase in the probability of attending a four-year college 
in the U.S. This rigidity is incorporated to the model. 
 
3 Competitive Equilibrium 
Definition (Competitive Equilibrium) Given the initial distribution of assets a0, 
population  0 μ , government transfers { } . , io io χ and expenditures  i g ; tax rates  c τ , k τ ,  p τ , 
and τ , fertility rates and skill transition probabilities { } ,, , , os os os ϕπ , survival probabilities   11
{ } i i λ , and immigration policy ψ , an equilibrium is a sequence 
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(i) { } ,,, ,,, 1 ,,, ,,, ,, iost iost i ost iost nca +  solves the individual’s problem, 
(ii) { } , tt KN solves the firm’s problem, 
(iii) The goods market clears:  
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(iv) The labor market clears (Equation (2) holds.), 
(v) Aggregate capital equals aggregate private wealth (Equation (3) holds.), 
(vi) The consumption tax rate balances the government's budget (Equation (9) holds.), 
(vii) Population evolves according to (10). 
 
4 Calibration 
I calibrate preference and production function parameters using the necessary conditions 
of the detrended version of the model. Efficiency units, children per person, skill 
transition probabilities, age-origin distribution of non-pension transfers, and total 
working hours are calculated using the German Socio-Economic Panel Data (GSOEP) 
that is published by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin). I used the 
European Commission’s Economic and Financial Affairs report on the German pension 
system (2005) to replicate the pension system. The income and social security tax 
schedule information comes from OECD’s 2006 report on taxing wages. 
 
4.1 The data 
The GSOEP is a representative longitudinal micro-data on persons and households in 
Germany that starts in 1984. It contains information on education levels, sources of 
income (labor income, transfers from the government and other sources of income), 
number of children, nationality, and work hours for the different groups that constitute 
the German population. Individuals over age 16 are interviewed every year. For the 
purposes of this paper, I use three sub-samples of the data: Sample A “Residents in the 
Federal Republic of Germany,” Sample B “Foreigners in the Federal Republic of 
Germany,” and Sample C “German residents in the German Democratic Republic.”    12
Sample A (the West-German sample) includes data on persons in private 
households with a household head who does not belong to the main foreigner groups of 
“guestworkers” (Turkish, Greek, Yugoslavian, Spanish, or Italian). Sample B has 
information on persons in private households with a household head from main foreigner 
guestworker groups. This sample consists of five autonomous samples for the five 
numerically largest foreign nationality groups living in West-Germany as immigrants in 
1984. Sample C, the East-German sample, covers persons in private households where 
the household head was a German Democratic Republic citizen.  
An immigrant in the model is an individual who belongs to the main foreigner 
guestworker groups. 
The distribution of aggregate public transfers among different transfer categories, 
as well as public expenditures other than transfers, is published by the German Statistical 
Institute (Statistisches Bundesamt). In this paper, I use the 2005 data.  
 
4.2 Preference parameters. The coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ , is assumed to be 
2.0 in the main calibration, which is commonly used in the literature for overlapping 
generations models.
5 The time preference parameterβ  is chosen so that the steady state 
equilibrium of the model replicates the capital-output ratio in the German economy. The 
consumption share parameter α  is chosen so that the steady state average annual 
working hours of individuals between the ages 20 and 59 are consistent with the GSOEP. 
On average, annual working hours are 1612. I suppose that the maximum working hours 
of an individual is 100 hours per week and 5200 hours per year. 
 
4.3 Efficiency units. The efficiency units for working-age individuals are estimated from 
the annual labor income profiles of immigrants and natives of each skill level and age. 
For the purposes of this paper, individuals with at least 15 years of schooling (the 
equivalent of three or more years of college education) are assumed to be high-skilled. 
Conditional on participation in the labor market (more than 450 hours a year), I calculate 
the average hourly wage for both immigrants and natives of working age for each skill 
level. Note that individuals in the model work only in the second and third periods of 
their lives, ages 20 to 59. Table 4 lists the estimated average hourly wages in Euros in 
2005. 
 
                                                 
5 For example, see Nishiyama and Smetters (2003, 2007).   13
4.4 Skill Transition. In order to calculate skill transition probabilities, I identify parents 
and children in the first sample of the micro panel data, 1984. I then divide parents into 
four groups: low-skilled natives, high-skilled natives, low-skilled immigrants, and high-
skilled immigrants. In order to find the skill level of their children, I follow the children 
in the data each year until the last sample in 2005. Children and parents with incomplete 
information on years of schooling over time are dropped from the sample. Given a 
category of parents, I find the skill transition probabilities by calculating the number of 
children of each skill level as a fraction of the total number of children who belong to 
those parents. Findings are presented in Table 5. 
 
4.5 Fertility Rates and the Initial Distribution of the Population 
Fertility rates. Children per person are estimated from the GSOEP for both immigrants 
and German natives of each skill level. Individuals can have children only in the second 
period of life in the model. Hence, the estimates in Table 6 correspond to children per 
person of ages 20-39 in the data. 
The challenge in calculating fertility across origins and skill levels is how to 
allocate children with one high-skilled and one low-skilled parent, or children who have 
one German and one immigrant parent. In this study, all children who have at least one 
immigrant parent are treated as children of immigrants. Once children have been 
allocated to German native or immigrant categories, the allocation of children to skill 
levels is done in accordance with the skill intensity in the household. 
 The following steps give the details of the procedure to calculate the number of 
children per fertile-age adult of each skill-s and origin-o: 
1. Link children and adults by matching their household numbers. Allocate children who 
are matched with both native and immigrant adults to the immigrant adults. This 
matching process forms “pseudo-households” consisting of fertile-age adults and the 
children who are allocated to them on the basis of origin. 
2. For each pseudo-household compute the proportion of adults who are of skill-s and 
multiply this by the number of children in the pseudo-household. 
3. Sum the results in Step 2 across pseudo-households in the data. This sum is the total 
number of children allocated to skill-s and origin-o. 
4. Divide the total number of children from Step 3 by the number of fertile-age adults of 
skill-s and origin-o in the micro-data.   14
The numbers in Table 6 are calculated as an average of figures between 1984 and 
2005. 
The Initial Distribution of the Population. The German Statistical Office Population 
Statistics summarizes the distribution of population across ages and nationalities. Data by 
education groups is not available. Therefore, I assume that the distribution of aggregate 
population across skills mimics the corresponding distribution from the micro-data, 
which is a representative sample of the whole population. Table 7 shows the calculated 
distribution of population for 2005. 
Survival Probabilities. I use data published by the Human Mortality Database at the 
University of California Berkeley. The last data available for Germany is for the year 
2005. Therefore, I assume that the survival probabilities are fixed at their 2005 levels. 
Calculated probabilities are shown in Table 8. 
 
4.6 Depreciation rate of fixed capital. Let η be the population growth rate on the 





δ η =− Γ −  
  In 2001, gross fixed capital formation (investment), GDP and total net capital 
stock for Germany were 420.8, 1979.6, 7165.5 billion Euros in current prices, 
respectively.
6 Given these values, I match a steady state capital-output ratio of 3.2 and 
and investment-output ratio of 0.21. Hence, the ratio of gross investment to fixed capital 
is 6.5 percent. I assume that the GDP per capita growth rate, Γ, is 1.89 percent, which is 
the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita in Germany for the last two decades.
7 
Note that the population growth rate on the balanced growth path depends on the 
immigration policy. For the baseline economy on a balanced growth path with 0.2 
percent immigration of each age-skill category annually, η is approximately 1 percent 
per year. 
 




δ θ += . 
Given YK = 0.31, r = 4.16 percent,  = δ 4.66 percent, we get  0.284. θ =  
Table 8 shows the values of the calibrated parameters other than those of tax schedule, 
fixed transfers, and social security.  
                                                 
6 See Kamps (2005). 
7 SourceOECD, Online Database, National Accounts Data (2006).   15
 
4.8 Taxes, Pensions, and Fixed-transfers 
Taxes.  All taxes in the model are collected at the individual level. The tax system 
includes progressive taxes on labor income as well as a capital income tax and a 
consumption tax. The capital income tax rate is assumed to be a flat-rate of 15 percent, 
which is the standard rate of corporate tax in Germany. The consumption tax adjusts in 
each period in order to balance the government budget. Therefore, it is a variable that is 
determined in equilibrium.  
  The labor income tax rate replicates the income tax schedule in Germany in 2005. 
The basic tax allowance is €7,664. The marginal tax rate increases linearly from 15 
percent to 24 percent until €12,739. Between €12,740 and €52,151, it increases linearly to 
42 percent.
8 For incomes higher than €52,152, the tax rate is constant at 42 percent (See 
Figure 2.). More specifically, let X be the taxable income rounded to the next full euro 
amount. Define Y = (X – 7,664)/10,000; Z = (X – 12,739)/10,000. The income tax liability 
(in Euros) is calculated according to the following formula:   
0                                          if  7,664  
(883.7 1,500)                if 7,665 12,739 
 
(228.7 2,397) 989     if 12,740 52,151 

















Compulsory social security contributions also replicate the marginal rates in 2005. 
They consist of a tax for pension and unemployment benefits (26 percent) up to a gross 
income ceiling €62,400, and tax for sickness and long-term care (14.7 percent) up to a 
gross income ceiling of €42,300 (See Figure 3.). Both the employer and the employee 
pay equal shares of the payroll tax. Since the incidence of the payroll tax does not affect 
the equilibrium results, I assume that it is fully paid by the employee. Figure 4 shows the 
sum of income and social security tax rates on income. Since all these rates are yearly 
and one period in the model is 20 years, the tax schedule in the calibration is adjusted to 
be compatible with the model.  
                                                 
8 See OECD (2006).   16
Pension Benefits. The general pay-as-you-go, earnings-related statutory pension scheme 
covers around 85 percent of the employed population.
9 For each year of contributions, a 
worker in the statutory pension scheme receives pension points that reflect his relative 
earnings position. The average wage in a particular year is equal to one pension point. 
The individual pension benefit at t (denoted as Pt) is calculated as the product of the sum 
of pension points earned through working-lifetime (pp) and the value of one pension 
point,  t ppv , measured in Euros per month. That is, 
*. tt Pp p p p v =
 
Pension point in working-year j is determined by the earning of an individual in that year 
( ,, ,,, j jos iosj we n ) relative to the average earnings of all the workers in the economy net of 













As an example, a person retiring with a contribution period of 40 years based on 
an average income earns 40 pension points over his working years. These pension points 
are multiplied by the current pension point value (€26.13 for pensioners from Western 
Germany), which gives a gross pension of 40 * €26.13 = €1,045.2 per month.  
The pension point value is adjusted annually. The adjustment factor depends on 
growth rate of gross earnings and "the sustainability factor," which reduces benefits if the 
number of contributors to the system decreases relative to the number of pensioners.
10  
In the model, each individual works for 40 periods (between the ages of 20 to 59) 
and retires at age 60.
11 I approximate the Sustainability Factor by the change in the ratio 
of pensioners to contributors from one period to another. Therefore, in the calibration, 
value of one pension point at time t is calculated as: 
                                                 
9 See Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2003). 
10 The adjustment formula also includes the "Riester Factor," which considers transition to a multi-pillar 
pension system in which contributions to tax subsidized voluntary private pension scheme (second pillar) 
reduce benefits in the public scheme (first pillar). However, Bonin (2001) and Börsch-Supan (2002) report 
that since the labor-market assumptions underlying the Riester Factor are unrealistic, its effects on the 
sustainability of the pension system will be minimal. Hence, I abstract away from it. 
11 In 2005, the average effective age of retirement in Germany was 61.7 for men and 60.7 for women. (See 
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The constant, 0.25, that multiplies the Sustainability Factor is called the "allocation 
factor" in the German Pension System. 
Non-pension Transfers per Person. Age-origin profiles of total transfers per capita are 
estimated from the GSOEP. The data includes questions about monthly old-age and 
disability benefits, child benefits, maternity benefits, general welfare, health and long-
term care benefits, housing allowances, subsistence allowances, and unemployment 
benefits. Since the pension, health and long-term care benefits are specifically modeled, 




I assume that the economy is initially on a balanced growth path (in 2005) with an annual 
inflow of 20-39 year old low- and high-skilled immigrants equal to 0.1 percent and 0.01 
percent of the German population, respectively. This corresponds to an annual net inflow 
of around 83,000 immigrants, which is in line with the data of 2005 and 2005 published 
by the German Statistical Institute. I investigate the resulting effects on allocations, 
prices, and welfare of an exogenous one-time change in immigration policy. I report 
welfare results from six different experiments in which either the skill distribution of 
immigrants or the total size of immigrant inflows change. All simulations are executed by 
detrending the model. The algorithm used to solve for the transition path is given in the 
Appendix. 
 
5.2 Equilibrium allocations and prices 
To set the background for the welfare results, I first summarize the effects on allocations 
and prices of a new immigration policy under which annual inflow of immigrants of each   18
type is 0.2 percent of the total population.
12 Figures 5-10 show the movement of the 
economy on the transition path. The year 2005 is the initial balanced growth path, 2025 is 
the first period after the policy change, and 2165 is the year in which the economy 
reaches the new balanced growth path. 
Consumption: This policy increases the consumption of individuals of every age, origin, 
and skill group. The main factor that affects equilibrium consumption is the decline in the 
consumption tax rate. Although immigrants increase government expenditures and 
pensions in the aggregate, government's tax revenue goes up by a bigger factor. Thus, the 
consumption tax rate that balances the budget goes down, allowing for an increase in 
consumption. For retirees, the increase in pension benefits generated through a lower 
dependency ratio is another factor that contributes to higher consumption. 
Labor supply: Labor supply is quite robust to the change in immigration policy. We 
observe a slight increase (0.1 percent) in hours worked for individuals aged 20-39 on the 
new balanced growth path. 40-59 year old workers experience a decline in the working 
hours by 0.2 percent. Note that 40-59 year old agents face two opposite effects. First, the 
rise in the rental rate increases the asset income, which reduces incentive to work. 
Second, the decline in wages provides incentive to work more. Here, the first effect 
dominates the second.
13  
Prices: With increased immigration, the rate of return on capital increases from 5.4 
percent in 2005 to 5.7 percent in 2165. The wage rate is lower on the transition path. An 
increased inflow of immigrants reduces the capital-labor ratio, which causes a decrease in 
the wage rate and an increase in the interest rate. 
Pensioner-contributor ratio: The ratio on the new balanced growth path (0.57) is 
smaller relative to its initial value (0.41). As more working-age immigrants are allowed, 
the imbalance created by rapid aging improves. 
Individual pensions: In this experiment, pension benefits increase. Two opposing factors 
contribute to this behavior through the indexation formula. First, declining wage earnings 
on the transition path push pension benefits down. Second, the reduction in the 
                                                 
12 I only report the welfare results for all experiments. The graphs for the other five experiments are 
available upon request. 
13 Individuals do not have asset income in the second period of the lifecycle. Hence, for them, the only 
relevant effect is the second one.   19
pensioner-contributor ratio due to increased immigration creates a rise in benefits through 
the sustainability factor. In this experiment, the second effect dominates. 
In summary, there are three interesting results. First, the exact modeling of the 
social security system enables us to assess the opposing interactions between changes in 
wages and changes in the pensioner-contributor ratio. The inclusion of the sustainability 
factor raises pension benefits via increasing the pension point value, compensating for a 
decline in benefits caused by declining wage earnings.  
 
5.3 Welfare 
In order to measure the change in welfare, I calculate percentage change in real income 
that is needed to achieve lifetime utility under the new immigration policy. Since 
individual preferences are of constant elasticity of substitution type, the change in real 
income is a perfect index of change in welfare. Table 10 summarizes the results for the 
new balanced growth path. 
  There are two main conclusions. First, when there is a prohibition on immigration 
(Experiment 1 in Table 10), native welfare goes down by 3 percent. Second, an increase 
in welfare may be achieved regardless of the skill type of immigrants. Keeping the total 
inflow constant, we see that policies admitting more low-skilled immigrants achieve a 
similar welfare improvement as policies admitting more high-skilled immigrants. The 
results indicate that the main channel through which immigration influences equilibrium 
allocations is the pensioner-contributor ratio. Bigger inflows, independent of the skill 
level, improve the dependency ratio by allowing more workers to enter the labor market. 
Low-skilled immigrants help slightly more, as their fertility rate is the highest among all 
types of agents in the economy. 
  On the new balanced growth path, relative to the initial path, we observe that 
consumption is higher. Labor supply is slightly higher for agents aged 20-39 and is lower 
for those aged 40-59. The increase in consumption is mostly due to a decline in the 
consumption tax rate. As an example, under Experiment 2, consumption tax rate goes 
down from its initial level of 20 percent to 9 percent. 
  Similar welfare conclusions hold on the transition path. Table 11 shows the 
results for cohorts alive at the first period of the policy change (2025). Figures 5 to 10   20
illustrate the behavior of some of the key equilibrium variables on the transition from the 
initial balanced growth path to the new one under Experiment 2. Welfare of all types of 
agents goes up under increased immigration scenarios.  
 
5.4 The Role of the Sustainability Factor 
To isolate the role of the sustainability factor in the results, I consider what would occur 

















where the pension point value at t depends only on its value at  1 t −  and the growth rate 
of earnings.  
  I evaluate the results from two experiments. First, I consider a shift to a policy 
that prohibits immigration. Second, I change the immigration policy such that annual 
inflow of each skill type of immigrants is 0.2 percent of the population. For each 
experiment, I first calculate two different equilibrium balanced growth paths - one with 
the sustainability factor in effect, and one without it. Then, I compare the outcomes. 
  Under a shift to a policy that prohibits immigration, consumption and welfare of 
each agent decline, regardless of whether or not the sustainability factor is included in 
benefit calculations. The reason is the rise in the pensioner-contributor ratio due to low 
native fertility. However, when the benefit formula includes the sustainability factor, the 
rise in the dependency ratio causes a decline in individual pensions. Hence, in the 
aggregate, government expenditures on pensions are lower compared to a no-
sustainability-factor scenario, which makes it possible for the budget to balance with a 
lower consumption tax rate. As a result, when the two balanced growth paths are 
compared, the one that incorporates the sustainability factor delivers lower individual 
pension benefits and consumption tax rate, but higher consumption and welfare. 
  In the case of positive immigrant inflows, the conclusion is reversed: individual 
consumption and welfare are higher in the absence of the sustainability factor. With more 
immigrants in the economy, the pensioner-contributor ratio declines. Hence, when the 
sustainability factor is included, the value of each pension point goes up, increasing the 
benefit for each individual. However, this also raises aggregate government spending on   21
pensions, necessitating a higher consumption tax rate to balance the budget. Therefore, 
the new balanced growth path consumption as well as welfare are lower compared to 
their levels when the sustainability factor is excluded from calculations. In this 
experiment, exclusion of the sustainability factor improves welfare 0.5 percent more 
relative to the outcome with the sustainability factor. 
  In summary, the inclusion of a sustainability factor is beneficial for an economy 
that tries to minimize immigration; but detrimental to one that would like to pursue a 
more liberal immigration policy. 
 
5.5 An increase in life-expectancy 
  In the developed world, life-expectancy has increased substantially over time. For 
example, over the last century, U.S. life-expectancy at birth rose from 48 to 75 years 
among men, and 51 to 80 years among women.
14 In Germany, between 1962 and 2002 
the average life expectancy has increased from 67.1 years to 75.6 years among men, and 
72.7 to 81.3 among women.
15 Therefore, it is important to understand the implications of 
immigration in an economy where individuals live longer.  
  To achieve this, I double the conditional probability of surviving from age 60+ to 
80+, that is, I set  4 0.658 λ =  in the new experiment. It is no surprise that increased life 
expectancy results in higher positive influence of immigration. As more people reach 
older ages, number of elderly relative to those of the working-age rises. Therefore, more 
immigration helps the economy by increasing the size of the contributors. On the 
transition path, welfare of each type increases by 0.1 to 0.3 percent relative to the level 
observed when  4 0.329. λ =  
 
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
In the model, the only parameter that is not calibrated is the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion  γ , whose value is assumed to be 2. The values that are used in the literature 
range from 0.5 to 4 for life-cycle models. To evaluate the robustness of the results to the 
degree of risk aversion, I solve for equilibrium where risk aversion is equal to 0.5, 1, or 3 
                                                 
14 Center for Disease Control and Prevention (2005). 
15See  Klenk, Rapp, Buchele, Keil, and Weiland (2007).   22
and report the percentage change in welfare on the new balanced growth path relative to 
2005. Under the new policy, the annual inflow of each type of immigrants is 0.2 percent 
of the population (Experiment 2). The results are presented in Table 13.  
  Although lower degrees of risk aversion lead to a smaller increase in welfare on 
the new balanced growth path, the behavior of the equilibrium allocations do not change. 
For all values of γ , consumption and welfare increase for all types, labor supply is 
steady, the wage rate declines, and the interest rate rises. 
 
6 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I analyzed how a change in immigration policy would affect government 
finances and individual choices by incorporating key elements of the German social 
security and income tax systems in an overlapping generations model. One of the main 
findings is that allowing an annual immigrant inflow equal to 0.4 percent of the 
population will increase consumption and welfare. This is due to a rise in the return to 
savings and a decrease in the consumption tax rate. There are two opposite effects of 
immigration on an individual's pension benefits. First, a decline in the wage rate reduces 
benefits, as the latter is strongly linked to the former through the indexation formula. 
Second, immigration leads to an improvement in the retiree-contributor ratio, which 
raises benefits through the sustainability factor. The net effect on pensions is positive. 
  Another interesting result is the improvement in welfare regardless of the skill 
composition of immigrants. Many heated debates on immigration in the developed world 
are based on the argument that low-skilled immigrants lower the well-being of natives 
because they bring wages down. This paper proves otherwise. Although native wages 
decline after an immigrant inflow, the improvement in the dependency ratio not only 
leads to a rise in pension benefits; but also reduces taxes on consumption. 
  Finally, the paper delivers a clear policy recommendation. Nations with aging 
populations would benefit from opening borders to young, working-age immigrants, as 
long as those individuals contribute to the system as tax-payers.   23
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Appendix 
An Equilibrium Transition Path 
I solve the detrended version of the model. I assume that the economy is in the 
corresponding initial steady state in period 0, and the new immigration policy 
{ } 2, 2, 3, 3, ,,, lhlh ψ ψψψψ = %% % % % is announced. I use the fixed point iteration algorithm (Judd, 
Kubler, and Schmedders 2003; Rios-Rull, 1997) to compute a transition path to the new 
steady-state equilibrium (thereafter, the final steady-state equilibrium) is as follows: 
1. Assume that the economy reaches the new steady state within a large number of 
periods, 20 in this case.
16 Set the initial guess on the interest rate sequence { }
20 0
1 t t r
= , 
consumption tax rate { }
20 0
, 1 ct t τ





=   
2. For periods  1,2,...,19, t = compute forward the measure of individuals according to the 
law of motion for population. Given the initial guesses, compute the new equilibrium 
interest rate { }
20 1
1 t t r
= , tax rate { }
20 1
, 1 ct t τ
= , and { }
20 1
1 t t y
=  sequences implied by the decision rules 
that would prevail if { }
20 0
1 t t r
= , { }
20 0
, 1 ct t τ





= were the true equilibrium sequences. 
3. New guesses of the interest rates, the consumption tax, and the average earnings are 
generated as an average of the previous guesses and the sequences implied by the 
individual and firm decision rules and the government’s budget constraint. 
4. Stop when  () ( ) ()
10 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
,, , 1,  1 ,   1 tt t c tc t c t t t t rr r yy y ττ τ −+ − + −+  is less 
than 0.006. 
5. Update guesses of interest rate, consumption tax, and average earnings by 
{ } { } { } { } { } { }
20 20 20 20 20 20 00 1 0 0 1
,, , 11 1 1 1 1 (1 ) ,  (1 ) ,   tt t c t c t c t tt t t t t rr r λλ τ λ τ λ τ
== = = = = =+ − = + −  
{ } { } { }
20 20 20 00 1
11 1 (1 ) tt t tt t yy y λλ
== = =+ −, where  ( ) 0,1 . λ ∈  
                                                 
16 After 7 periods, which corresponds to 140 years, the annualized rate of return on capital is 0.001percent 
away from its steady state value.   27
Figure 2. Marginal Income Tax Rates, 2005 
 
Figure 3. Marginal Payroll Tax Rates, 2005 
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Figure 5. Consumption per Capita (consumption of 20-39 year old high-skilled native in 2005=100) 
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Figure 9. Annual Rate of Return on Capital (in percentage) 
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Table 1. Main Variables and Functions in the Model 
Individual type ( ) ,, ios :  
i  { } 1, 2,3, 4 ∈ Age 
o  { } , mn ∈   Origin (migrant, native) 
s   { } , lh ∈   Working ability (low, high) 
Individual decisions: 
,, ios c    Consumption 
,, ios n    Working  hours 
1, , io s a +    End-of-period  wealth 
Main parameters and other variables: 
β     Time preference 
α  
+ ∈ℜ   Share of consumption in the utility function 
γ     Coefficient of relative risk aversion 
Γ   ∈ℜ  Productivity growth rate of the economy 
η   ∈ℜ  Population growth rate 
θ   + ∈ℜ   Share of capital in the production function 
δ   + ∈ℜ   Depreciation rate 
, os ϕ   ∈ℜ  Number of children per person of origin-o, skill-s 
t w   + ∈ℜ   Wage rate 
t r    Interest rate 
,, ios e     Efficiency  
, os π     Probability that individual (o, s) has a high-skilled child 
i λ    Conditional probability of surviving from age i to i+1 
Government policy: 
i g    Age specific government expenditures per capita 
,, iot χ     Transfer per person of age-i, origin-o 
τ  
+ ∈ℜ   Marginal income tax rate 
p τ   + ∈ℜ   Marginal payroll tax rate 
c τ   + ∈ℜ   Consumption tax rate (flat) 
k τ   + ∈ℜ  
Capital income tax rate (flat) 
Immigration policy ψ : 
{ } {} 2, , s s lh ψ
∈     Number of immigrants aged 20-39 of working ability 
{ } , sl h ∈  as a fraction of population at t-1 
Joint distribution of individuals  t μ : 
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Table 2. Other Aggregate Variables in the Model 
t K     Capital stock 
t N    Total effective units of labor 
t Y    Gross national product 
t G    Aggregate government expenditures  
t Pen    Aggregate pension benefits 
t Rev    Aggregate government tax revenues 
t TR   + ∈ℜ   Aggregate government fixed transfers 
 
 
Table 3. Parameters and Target Variables 
Parameter Notation  Target  variable  Value 
Share parameter for 
consumption 
α Average annual working hours in the 
steady state equals 1612h 
0.26 
Time preference  β   Capital-output ratio in the steady state 
equals 3.2 
0.98 
Coefficient of relative risk 
aversion  
γ  2.00 
Depreciation rate of capital 
stock 
δ   Capital-output ratio equals 3.2, 
investment-output ratio equals 0.21 in 
the steady state 
0.046 
Capital share of output  θ   Capital-output ratio in the steady state 
equals 3.2 
0.29 
Long-term real growth rate  Γ   Average annual growth rate of GDP 
per capita in the last two decades 
1.89 
All rates are annual. 
 
 
Table 4. Estimated Average Hourly Wages (before-tax), 2005  
 Low-skilled  High-skilled 
German natives:     
   Ages 20-39  25.9  36.0 
   Ages 40-59  29.9  44.0 
Immigrants:    
   Ages 20-39  24.0  26.6 
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Table 5. Skill Transition Probabilities 
  Probability of having a 
 low-skilled child 
Probability of having a  
high-skilled child 
German natives:     
   Low-skilled  0.83  0.17 
   High-skilled  0.58  0.42 
Immigrants:    
   Low-skilled  0.92  0.08 
   High-skilled  0.66  0.34 
 
 
Table 6. Number of Children per Fertile-Age Person 
 German  natives  Immigrants 
Low-skilled 0.84  1.14 
High-skilled 0.80  0.84 
 
 















 0-19  20-39  40-59  60-79 
Immigrants:        
Low-skilled 3.59  1.82  1.11  0.36 
High-skilled 0.23 0.11 0.07  0.04 
Natives:      
Low-skilled 13.08  17.48  17.48  14.33 
High-skilled 2.99 4.01 4.12  1.75   34
Table 8. Parameter values (excluding taxes, transfers, and social security) 
Parameter Notation  Value 
Share parameter for consumption  α   0.26 
Time preference  β   0.98 
Coefficient of relative risk aversion aversion  γ   2.00 
Depreciation rate of capital stock  δ   0.046 
Capital share of output  θ   0.29 
Long-term real growth rate  Γ   1.89 
Gov’t expenditures per person aged 0-19 (€) 
1 g   8,848 
Gov’t expenditures per person aged 20-39 (€) 
2 g   5,503 
Gov’t expenditures per person aged 40-59 (€) 
3 g   5,008 
Gov’t expenditures per person aged 60-79 (€) 
4 g   5,008 
Children per high-skilled native 
, hn ϕ   0.80 
Children per low-skilled native 
, ln ϕ   0.84 
Children per high-skilled immigrant 
, hm ϕ   0.84 
Children per low-skilled immigrant 
, lm ϕ   1.14 
Efficiency of high-skilled native aged 20-39  
2, , nh e   36.0 
Efficiency of low-skilled native aged 20-39  
2, , nl e   25.9 
Efficiency of high-skilled native aged 40-59  
3, , nh e   44.0 
Efficiency of low-skilled native aged 40-59  
3, , nl e   28.9 
Efficiency of high-skilled immigrant aged 20-39  
2, , mh e   26.6 
Efficiency of low-skilled immigrant aged 20-39  
2, , ml e   24.0 
Efficiency of high-skilled immigrant aged 40-59  
3, , mh e   38.3 
Efficiency of low-skilled immigrant aged 40-59  
3, , ml e   26.7 
Probability of having a high-skilled child for a high-skilled native 
, nh π   0.42 
Probability of having a high-skilled child for a low-skilled native 
, nl π   0.17 
Probability of having a high-skilled child for a high-skilled immig. 
, mh π   0.34 
Probability of having a high-skilled child for a high-skilled immig. 
, ml π   0.08 
Probability of surviving from age 0-19 to age 20-39 
1 λ   0.990 
Probability of surviving from age 20-39 to age 40-59 
2 λ   0.957 
Probability of surviving from age 40-59 to age 60-79 
3 λ   0.786 
Probability of surviving from age 60-79 to age 80-99 
4 λ   0.329 
All rates are annual.   35







Annual, in Euros. 
 
Table 10. Welfare Change on the New Balanced Growth Path 
Experiment  Annual 
Immigration (%) 
Percentage Change in Welfare 
   High  Low 
Native Immigrant 
High Low High Low 
1 0.0  0.0  -3.3  -3.3  --  -- 
2  0.2 0.2 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
            
3  0.3 0.1 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.7 
4  0.1 0.3 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.9 
            
5  0.4 0.1 4.5 4.6 4.5 4.6 
6  0.1 0.4 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.9 
 
 
Table 11. Welfare Change during the Transition to the New Balanced Growth Path 
Experiment  Annual 
Immigration (%) 
Percentage Change in Native Welfare (by age in 2025) 
   High  Low 
20-39 40-59  60-79  80-99 
High Low High Low  High  Low  High  Low 
2  0.2  0.2  2.8 2.8 2.1 1.7  0.9  0.9  0.1  0.1 
                        
3  0.3  0.1  2.8 2.8 2.0 1.8  0.8  0.9  0.2  0.2 
4  0.1  0.3  2.9 2.9 2.1 1.7  0.9  0.9  0.1  0.1 
                        
5  0.4  0.1  3.5 3.7 2.5 2.2  1.1  1.1  0.2  0.2 
6  0.1  0.4  3.8 3.7 2.6 2.2  1.1  1.1  0.2  0.2 
 
Age Germans  Immigrants 
0-19 2,481  1,997 
20-39 3,372 3,079 
40-59 4,392 5,219 
60-79 16,469  11,816   36
 
Table 12. The Welfare Effects of Immigration when the Probability of Surviving to the Age of 
80+ is Doubled 
Experiment Annual 
Immigration (%) 
Percentage Change in Native Welfare (by age in 2025) 
   High  Low 
20-39 40-59  60-79  80-99 
High Low High  Low  High Low High Low 
2  0.2  0.2  3.1 3.1 2.4  2.0  1.1 1.1 0.2 0.2 
                        
3  0.3  0.1  3.0 3.1 2.3  2.0  1.1 1.1 0.3 0.3 
4  0.1  0.3  3.2 3.2 2.4  2.0  1.1 1.1 0.2 0.2 
                        
5  0.4  0.1  3.8 3.9 2.9  2.5  1.5 1.5 0.3 0.3 
6  0.1  0.4  4.0 4.0 3.0  2.5  1.4 1.4 0.3 0.3 
 
 
Table 13: Sensitivity Analysis: Percentage Change in Welfare on the New Balanced 
Growth Path for Various Risk Aversion Coefficients under Experiment 2 
   Welfare (%) 
Coefficient of Risk Aversion 
Native Immigrant 
High Low High Low 
0.5  1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 
1.0  0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 
2.0  3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
3.0  5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 
 